## 1NC

**Off**

**Their rhetoric of peaceful cooperation is mere Bush-style whitewashing of mass violence**

**Porotsky 13** (Sophia Porotsky, MA honors candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews, April 26th, 2013, “Pax Americana: The Successful Securitization of the Triple Threat of Terrorism, “Outlaw” Regimes, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” http://www.academia.edu/3482477/Pax\_Americana\_The\_Successful\_Securitization\_of\_the\_Triple\_Threat\_of\_Terrorism\_Outlaw\_Regimes\_and\_Weapons\_of\_Mass\_Destruction) gz

Transforming the semantics of an act involves “replacing unpleasant reality with desirable rhetoric, gilding the frame so that the real picture is disguised” (Zimbardo, 2009: 273). The use of sanitizing or euphemistic language is ubiquitous in the government texts. For example, Bush declares: ¶ “We will use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to build an atmosphere of international order and openness in which progress and liberty can flourish in many nations. A peaceful world of growing freedom serves American long-term interests, reflects enduring American ideals, and unites America’s allies. We defend this peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes” (Bush, 2002d).¶ In this excerpt Bush cloaks military action with euphemistic statements such as ‘building an atmosphere of international order and openness’ and ‘defending the peace,’ he sanitizes the means by accentuating the morally justifiable ends of ‘peace’, ‘order’, and ‘openness’. Tapping into the political myth of American Exceptionalism, Bush justifies the end goal by framing it as a cause for the greater good of the world. Bandura expands on the effects of sanitizing language and euphemistic labeling stating:¶ “Language shapes thought patterns on which actions are based. Activities can take on very different appearances depending on what they are called…euphemistic language is widely used to make harmful conduct respectable and to reduce personal responsibility for it…people behave much more cruelly when assaultive actions are verbally sanitized than when they are called aggression” (Bandura, 1999: 195). ¶ This statement substantiates the claim that adopting a particular discourse when describing violent action disguises the true meaning of the act, while simultaneously reinforcing the justifications from the War on Terrorism narrative. A further example can be found in Bush’s Address to the Nation where he asserts:¶ “These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations…Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice…As we strike military targets, we’ll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan” (Bush, 2001k).¶ Describing military actions as ‘carefully targeted’ implies that the army is striking only military targets with surgical precision; it encourages people to overlook any ‘collateral damage,’ a euphemism for civilian casualties, in the process. Additionally, Bush excuses the implicit collateral damage by demonstrating the benevolence of the United States. Dropping humanitarian aid compensates for the consequences of military action. Bush then reinforces the benevolent image of the United States by tapping into discourses of women and children and suffering, assigning the role of savior of the Afghan people to the United States. The altered semantics of this act is revealed upon a comparison of the reality on the ground versus the narrative Bush was constructing. While Bush claimed that the military campaign in Afghanistan was ‘carefully targeted’ and ‘precise,’ in reality the military was carpet bombing Afghanistan using cluster bombs (Lee, 2005: 279). Carpet bombing can be understood as “the progressive distribution of a mass bomb load upon an area…in such a manner as to inflict damage to all portions within the boundaries” (Keane, 2005: 30). Thus, carpet bombing by definition is indiscriminate, the polar opposite of ‘carefully targeted’ or ‘precise.’ Moreover, cluster bombs “disperse large numbers of explosive submunitions over wide areas and often fail to explode immediately, leaving a long-term legacy of explosive contamination” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009). Cluster bombs in particular have provoked international criticism due to their “unique characteristics that make them a grave danger to civilian men, women and children… causing high civilian casualties especially when they are used in populated areas… Many thousands of civilians have been tragically killed and injured by coming into contact with unexploded submunitions” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009). Thus, the narrative Bush was constructing could not be further from the reality. While Bush was highlighting the benevolence and good will of the US, the US military was inflicting the maximum amount of indiscriminate damage. Ironically, the humanitarian aid packages Bush was referring to were the same bright yellow color as the unexploded cluster bomblets (Lee, 2005: 279), further endangering civilians who could easily mistake the submunitions for food or medicine. Bush obscuring the sordid realities and stressing the good will of the US contributes to moral justification, which is essential for the American public acceptance of securitization. Moral justifications are a requisite of moral disengagement, since these justifications are the basis on which morally reprehensible acts are perpetrated.

**This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence**

**Burke, 7** (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action**.** The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

**The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis**

**Krause and Williams 97** (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

**Off**

**A. Interpretation – “economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action – it cannot encompass broader forms of engagement**

**Jakstaite, 10** - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “Containment and Engagement as Middle-Range Theories” Baltic Journal of Law & Politics Volume 3, Number 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/V10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations

**That means trade and aid in the form of loans or grants**

**Resnick, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” Vol. 54 No. 2, Political Science Complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT

In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS

Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations

Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes

Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa

MILITARY CONTACTS

Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa

Arms transfers

Military aid and cooperation

Military exchange and training programs

Confidence and security-building measures

Intelligence sharing

ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Trade agreements and promotion

Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants

CULTURAL CONTACTS

Cultural treaties

Inauguration of travel and tourism links

Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

**IP**

**U.S. IP leadership enables a neocolonial agenda of global neoliberal domination---this link is phenomenally specific to plan action**

Ugo **Mattei 9**, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi\_legal\_papers

There is a **clear pattern of continuity**, not of rupture, between the current policy trend in the international institutional setting and earlier practices, in particular **colonialism**. The Western world, under current **U.S. leadership**, **having persuaded itself of its superior position**, largely justified by its form of government, has succeeded in diffusing rule of law ideology as universally valid, **behind whose shadows plunder hides**, both in domestic and in international matters. Present-day international interventions led by the United States are no longer openly colonial efforts. They might be called **neo-colonial, imperialistic** or simply post-colonial interventions. Although practically all of European colonial states (most notably Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, France, Germany and even Italy) regarded themselves as empires, the concept of ‘empire’ is what best describes the present phase of multinational capitalist development with the USA as the most important, hegemonic superpower, **using the rule of law to pave the way for international corporate domination**. Export of the law can be described and explained in a variety of ways. A first example is the imperialistic/colonial rule, or imposition of law by military rules, as during military conquest: Napoleon imposed his Civil Code to French-occupied Belgium in the early nineteenth century. Similarly, General MacArthur imposed a variety of legal reforms based on the American government model in post World War II Japan, as a condition of the armistice in the aftermath of Hiroshima. Today, Western-style elections and a variety of other laws governing everyday life are imposed in countries under US occupation, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. A second model can be described as imposition by bargaining, in the sense that acceptance of law is part of a subtle extortion11. Target countries are persuaded to adopt legal structures according to Western standards or face exclusion from international markets. This model describes the experience of China, Japan and Egypt in the early twentieth century, and, indeed, contemporary operations of the World Bank, IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other Western development agencies (United States Agency for International Development (USAID), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and so on) in the ‘developing’ and former socialist world. A third model, **constructed as fully consensual**, is **diffusion by prestige**, a deliberate process of institutional admiration that leads to the reception of law.12 According to this vision, because modernization requires complex legal techniques and institutional arrangements, the **receiving legal system**, more simple and primitive, cannot cope with the new necessities. It lacks the culture of the rule of law, something that can **only be imported from the West**. Every country that in its legal development has ‘**imported’ Western law** has thus **acknowledged its ‘legal inferiority’** by admiring and thus voluntarily attempting to import Western institutions. Turkey during the time of Ataturk, Ethiopia at the time of Haile Selassie and Japan during the Meiji restoration are modern examples. Interestingly, **if the transplant ‘fails’**, such as with the attempts to impose Western-style regulation on the Russian stock market, or as with **many law and development enterprises**, it is the **recipient society that receives the blame**. Local shortcomings and ‘lacks’ are said to have precluded progress in the development of the rule of law. When the World Bank produces a development report on legal issues, it invariably shows insensitivity for local complexities and suggests radical and universal transplantation of Western notions and institutions.

**China doesn’t pose a security threat to the US**

**Zenko and Cohen 12** (Micah Zenko, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, and MIchael Cohen, Senior Fellow at the American Security Project, serves on the board of the National Security Network and has taught at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, served in the U.S. Department of State, former Senior Vice President at the strategic communications firm of Robinson, Lerer and Montgomery, bachelor’s degree in international relations from American University and a master’s degree from Columbia University, 3/14/2012, "Clear and Present Safety", yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/clear-and-present-safety)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, **the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so**. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet **none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade**, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that **Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one**.

**China’s not a threat**

**Jiang, 7** – Deputy Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Shixue, “Three Factors in Recent Development of Sino-Latin American Relations,” in ENTER THE DRAGON? China’s Presence in Latin America, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf, JMP)

THE U.S. FACTOR IN SINO-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS A closer relationship between China and Latin America has caused concern in the **U**nited **S**tates. At a hearing of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on April 6, 2005, U.S. Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN) said, “The traditional goals of U.S. policy in Latin America have always included promoting political stability, promoting democracy, increasing access to markets, and preventing the rise of hegemonic power. Until we know the definitive answer to this question of whether China will play by the rules of fair trade and engage responsibly on transnational issues, I believe we should be cautious and view the rise of Chinese power as something to be counterbalanced or contained, and perhaps go so far as to consider China’s actions in Latin America as the movement of a hegemonic power into our hemisphere.”4 Burton mistakenly considered the development of Sino-Latin American relations as a danger to the **U**nited **S**tates. He said at the hearing, “I believe China’s rising economic, political and military influence in the Western hemisphere poses serious challenges to the United States in the years ahead. And if we are not careful, Beijing’s influence could easily unravel the region’s hard-won, U.S.-backed reforms to fight against corruption, human rights abuses, increase government transparency and combat intellectual property violations, and the democracies that we see as fledgling democracies could be in real jeopardy. We must work in earnest to prevent this from happening.” At the hearing, the U.S. Congressman even said, “I would also caution our friends throughout Latin America about granting China full market economy status. I think it is clear that China’s state subsidies, its currency peg, and poor labor rights conditions disqualify China from truly deserving ‘market economy status.’ Consequently, granting China full market economy status would be, in my view, a grave error in judgment.” The news media in the **U**nited **S**ates have been portraying a wrong perception of the development of Chinese relations with Latin America. One editorial in the Wall Street Journal, for instance, says, “The rise of China in the region could complicate U.S. efforts to control illegal immigration, weapons shipments, the drug trade and money laundering because China is cooperating with Latin countries that are not especially friendly toward those efforts. Some of these nations may try to use the Chinese alternative to challenge U.S. hegemony.”5 The United States’ concern over the closer relationship between China and Latin America is misplaced and unnecessary. It is well-known that Latin America has been on the path of reform and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market so as to stimulate growth. As a result, China is **only one** of the economic partners with whom Latin America has been trying to cooperate. China understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the **U**nited **S**tates, so China has **no intention whatsoever to challenge the American hegemony** in Latin America. Both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization both of them should cooperate to push forward South-South cooperation. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific region and in Latin America. Such an outcome would also certainly favor of the **U**nited **S**tates.

**No China war**

**Goldstein 11** - Professor and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute @ US Naval War College [Dr. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival | vol. 53 no. 2 | April–May 2011 | pp. 89–116

Weighed in the aggregate, China’s rise remains a peaceful process, and the record to date should engender significant confidence. Beijing has not resorted to a significant use of force against another state in more than three decades. Its deployments of troops as UN peacekeepers to hot spots such as Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have played a helpful role, as have the counter-piracy operations of its fleet in the Gulf of Aden. When dealing with weak and occasionally unstable states on its borders, such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, Beijing has not resorted to military intervention, nor even flexed its military muscles to gain advantage. Chinese maritime claims, whether in the South or the East China seas, are generally being enforced by unarmed patrol cutters, a clear signal that Beijing does not seek escalation to a major crisis on these matters. Contrary to the perception that China’s senior military officers are all irreconcilable hawks, one influential People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral recently said in an interview, with reference to lessons learned from recent border negotiations on China’s periphery: ‘If there are never any concessions or compromises, there is simply no possibility of reaching a breakthrough in border negotiations.’2 pg. 90

**Representations of China as a threat ignore the normative value-judgments inherent to the process of claiming to empirically know Chinese national and political identity—this makes security threats self-fulfilling prophecies**

**Pan, 4** – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics”, Alternatives RC)

China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means**.** For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dangerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident

**Biotech**

**No impact food insecurity and it’s inevitable**

**OECD, 11** ("Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses", Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Collaborative report undertaken by the FAO, IFAD, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, WTO, IFPRI and UN HLTF, June, www.oecd.org/trade/agricultural-trade/48152638.pdf)

Most agricultural commodity markets are characterized by a high degree of volatility. Three major market fundamentals explain why that is the case. First, agricultural output varies from period to period because of natural shocks such as weather and pests. Second, demand elasticities are relatively small with respect to price and supply elasticities are also low, at least in the short run. In order to get supply and demand back into balance after a supply shock, prices therefore have to vary rather strongly, especially if stocks are low. Third, because production takes considerable time in agriculture, supply cannot respond much to price changes in the short term, though it can do so much more once the production cycle is completed. The resulting lagged supply response to price changes can cause cyclical adjustments (such as the often referenced „hog cycle‟) that add an extra degree of variability to the markets concerned. Business cycle fluctuations in demand for agricultural non-food commodities (such as cotton) from rapidly growing, industrializing economies may also be contributing to increased volatility.

**No extinction from disease**

Malcolm **Gladwell**, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 19**95**, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

**The fear of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”**

**Gomel 2000** (Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

**Econ**

**No border terrorism and the status quo solves**

**Powell 11** – Houston Chronicle writer(Stewart M., “Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas From Mexico?”, 12/2/11; < http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-Texas-from-2341185.php>)//Beddow

Pakistani officials told Texas' Republican Congressman Michael McCaul on a recent visit to Karachi that potential operatives from Pakistan, Iran, al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Haqqani network can obtain visas for Mexico from Mexican diplomatic outposts in Pakistan far more easily than getting them for the United States, making Mexico a perfect way station. Yet despite these dire possibilities - including Perry's contention that Hamas and Hezbollah are working in Mexico to come to the U.S. - experts say such Iranian-financed factions are not crossing the southwest border. They point instead to the 327 airports and border crossings in the United States where legitimate or forged passports might be used the same way that 19 hijackers gained access to carry out the 9/11 attacks. "The last thing these organizations want is to start out at the border with a high profile criminal act that gets attention," says James Carafano, a West Point graduate and retired Army lieutenant colonel handling security affairs at the Heritage Foundation. "They want to be as unobtrusive as possible." Federal law enforcement agents picked up 445,000 border crossers last year. But only 13 Iranians were taken into custody, a fraction of the 663 "special interest aliens" from 35 countries detained along the southwestern border for special U.S. scrutiny. None of the Iranians - indeed none of the 663 "special interest aliens" - has faced federal prosecution on terror-related charges, according to federal officials. No credible cases The number of Iranians apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol "has been historically minimal," said a Department of Homeland Security official. "No credible terrorist threat has been identified, however DHS carefully monitors any potential threats along the Southwest border and responds accordingly."

**No risk of bioterror**

**Mueller 99**, John Mueller, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Ohio State and Karl Mueller, June, ’99 (Foreign Affairs, l/n)

Biological weapons seem a promising candidate to join nuclear ones in the WMD club because, properly developed and deployed, they might indeed kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical, however, because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used, even though knowledge of their destructive potential goes back centuries. (The English, for example, made some efforts to spread smallpox among American Indians during the French and Indian War.) Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason, because biological weapons are extremely difficult to deploy and control. Although terrorist groups or rogue states may overcome such problems in the future through advances in knowledge and technology, the record thus far is not likely to encourage them. Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures may have killed thousands of Chinese but apparently also caused thousands of unintended casualties among Japanese troops and had little military impact. In the 1990s the large and extremely well funded Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo apparently tried at least nine times to set off biological weapons by spraying pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops. these efforts failed to cause a single fatality -- in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. For best results biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds, which is very difficult to do. Explosive methods of dispersion, moreover, may destroy the organisms. And except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult; even if refrigerated, most have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons are gradual, very hard to predict, and could spread back onto the attacker, and they can be countered with civil defense measures.

**Bioterror discourse is grounded in a sense of vulnerability that turns the advantage – alt is key to solve**

**Kittelsen, 9** – Researcher for the Security programme @ the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Sonja, “Conceptualizing Biorisk: Dread Risk and the Threat of Bioterrorism in Europe,” Security Dialogue vol. 40, no. 1, February)

The dread that the prospect of bioterrorism elicits thus not only compounds the distinction between actual and imagined threat, but also challenges the conventional spatio-temporal relationship between ‘threat’ and ‘security’, in that it reinforces a sense of imminence and pervasiveness of possible attack. Its imperceptible nature means that insecurity can exist independent of an actual attack occurring, the mere threat of infection and contagion carrying the capacity to evoke a heightened sense of fear long before and well after an attack has been identified as ever having taken place. In the absence of fact about a threat that deliberately evades detection, the demand on governments to act proactively has become all the more salient, and providing for security has taken a precautionary turn. Strategies aimed at mitigating the threat of bioterrorism have thus involved attempts at delineating security through spatio-temporal techniques that involve intervening in the present in order to avoid the potential for serious and irreversible damage in the future. They constitute an attempt at rearticulating the boundary between ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ space through the active act of anticipation. Inherent in such an anticipatory logic, however, is an in-built vulnerability, in that this logic is necessarily informed by the subjective insecurities that the threat of bioterrorism elicits. It simultaneously functions within and constitutes a product of the dread that the threat of bioterrorism evokes, and accordingly does not so much serve to reduce the threat of bioterrorism as it serves to mitigate the effects of what is considered an inevitable occurrence. It there- by runs the risk of perpetuating insecurity to the extent that it facilitates threat through its enactment. Engaging with the threat of bioterrorism, then, neces- sarily requires recognizing how the same logic that informs the dread that bioterrorism elicits also serves to inform the security practices pursued to confront it. Just as the molecular body is no longer conceptualized as a unified whole, so too is Europe less a self-contained entity than a site of circulation and exchange. Mitigating the threat of bioåterrorism, then, necessitates explor- ing the ways in which security practices and perceptions of threat interact with each other and with the more tangible aspects of the threat of bioterror- ism to make Europe not only vulnerable to biological insecurity, but also a producer and perpetuator of it. This article argues that it is by conceptualizing bioterrorism through the notion of ‘dread risk’ that this self-perpetuation of vulnerability and threat can be exposed and the necessary inroads provided by which to engage more critically with the threat of bioterrorism, its produc- tion and perpetuation, as well as with the constitution of ‘security’ itself.

**No threat – weak leadership and no recent attacks**

**Zenko and Cohen 12**, \*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.

Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.

According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

**No risk of Mexican collapse – their authors are alarmists**

**NAM, 11**

New America Media, the country's first and largest national collaboration and advocate of 2000 ethnic news organizations, founded by the nonprofit Pacific News Service in 1996; “Mexico and the Myth of the ‘Failed State’,” 7/9/2011, http://newamericamedia.org/2011/07/mexico-and-the-myth-of-the-failed-state.php //bghs-ms

MERIDA, Mexico— For more than four decades, Americans have expressed alarm at what they see the imminent collapse of the Mexican government, warning their fellow citizens that Mexico is a “failed state.” But far from being a “failed state,” Mexico is proving itself to be one of the most successful countries in the world, one that has made the transition from an agrarian economy to a modern industrialized one, while moving from a closed, authoritarian regime to a vibrant democracy. Far too many Americans make the mistake of thinking Mexico as the country portrayed in the 1950s. Over the past half century, it has become one of the most important economies in the world. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the CIA World Factbook each rank Mexico as the 14th largest economy. Mexico has one of the most comprehensive social welfare programs anywhere in the hemisphere. This is a country that strives, albeit imperfectly and not always successfully, to provide for the general well-being. Yes, given its resources and its population, many people fall between the cracks. Of Mexico’s population of 110 million, some 30 million, or a little over a quarter, are living in the “informal economy,” as it is euphemistically called. For comparative purposes, 1.5 in 10 Americans rely on food stamps, and in the largest American city, New York, 1 in 4 children live below the federal poverty line. No country addresses all of the needs of its people, but Mexico is diligent in at least working towards that end. If you think that Mexico is a country with no laws or legal institutions, a kind of place reminiscent of some Hollywood movie where it’s the “Wild, Wild West,” then you are in for a surprise. Mexico is one of the most bureaucratic nations in the hemisphere—it rivals France when it comes to official paperwork! And it rivals the Scandinavian countries when it comes to its aspirations for being a “nanny state.” In fact, international agencies—from the World Bank to the International Monetary Fund—continue to remind Mexico that it has to “streamline” its bureaucracy if it wants to become more competitive in the global economy. Americans, however, are reluctant to give Mexico credit where credit is due. The myth of Mexico as a “failed state” began with Barry Goldwater, who lamented that the 1968 Summer Olympic Games were being held in Mexico City, the capital of what he called a “faltering” nation. Since then, Americans have discovered that Mexico-bashing is a sure way of making a quick buck on trash books. “This is an attempt to understand Mexico's steep descent into turmoil,” is how Andres Oppenheimer’s 1998 book, Bordering on Chaos, was marketed. Less than two years later, Mexico made a peaceful transition for a single-party state to a full democracy by electing its first opposition leader in seven decades. According to American commentators, a decade later, Mexico is still on the “verge” of collapsing. “The [Mexican] state has not yet taken control of drug trafficking, and its strength is steadily diminishing,” is George Grayson’s 1999 take in his book, “Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?” The book claimed to document “state disintegration.” And the news media continues to feed a constant stream of “failed state” alarmism. From the Wall Street Journal to National Public Radio, Americans are told of Mexico’s impending collapse. Joel Kurtzman warned in the Journal in 2009 that: “Mexico is at risk of becoming a failed state. Defense planners liken the situation to that of Pakistan, where wholesale collapse of civil government is possible.”

**Countless factors check collapse**

**Grayson, 10**

George W. Grayson, Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary senior associate at CSIS, an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a member of the board of advisers of the Latin American Advisor, and senior adviser on Mexican affairs for the Washington-based Capital Insights Group, having made more than 125 research trips to Mexico; “Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?”, 2010, pg. 272 //bghs-ms

Only a Cassandra in deep funk could conclude that Mexico will implode as is possible in Afghanistan or Pakistan. There are too many factors – the Mexican armed forces, the Roman Catholic church, the middle class, the Monterrey business community, the banking system, labor and professional organisations, the U.S government, and international financial institutions [IMF,World Bank], etc.- to let this happen. Felipe Calderon and his successors must act to prevent ungovernability in cities like Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, and in states like Guerrero, Durango, Sinaloa, and Michoacan.

**Mexico isn’t on the verge of collapse**

**Al Jazeera, 12**

“Mexico: Failed state or economic giant?”, 10/3/2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/thecafe/2012/09/20129161631565644.html //bghs-ms

Kidnappings, torture and beheadings - the so-called war on drugs has ravaged Mexico for years. With 60,000 dead, and counting, some say that America’s southern neighbour is on the verge of becoming a failed state. But as record foreign direct investment pours into the country and the economy keeps growing, there is also another side to Mexico. In this country, headlines about the world’s richest man, becoming a top ten global economy and being the seventh largest oil producer compete with grisly news of journalists killed or dead bodies dumped from Ciudad Juarez to Acapulco.

## 2NC

### A2: Perm do Both

**7. The permutation engages security through a political telos – blocks off critique**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

### AT: FW

Situatedness determines political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

4. Their framework causes passivity

Antonio 95 (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

### AT: Moore

**Incentive theory doesn’t explain war, causes violence**

**Goodman ‘5** (Ryan, Harvard Law School, “International Institutions and the Mechanisms of War” American Journal of International Law lexis)

John Norton Moore’s Solving the War Puzzle raises important issues for fashioning institutions to prevent war. The book presents a detailed argument supporting two strategies -- democracy promotion and deterrence. Moore highlights the proper analytic question: what mechanisms motivate states to initiate war? As a methodological matter, Moore does well to ground this inquiry in empirical evidence. He ultimately proposes an "incentive theory," in which the political and material self-interest of governmental leaders is central to an account of the causes of war. This explanation, however, involves an unduly restrictive view of the reasons for which states wage war. The theory provides a **thin conception** of human motivation. The theory neither adequately explains the behavioral regularities that Moore identifies nor accounts for other patterns of international armed conflict. Contrary to Moore’s analysis, an array of recent theoretical and empirical studies -- some of which are used by Moore, and some not -- suggests the potential significance of mechanisms that are not grounded in incentives.

Identifying these mechanisms is essential to designing a coherent and effective international regime. Each mechanism supports democracy promotion (albeit for different reasons), yet some may conflict with particular deterrence-based strategies. At a fundamental level, each mechanism suggests distinct, and often competing, views of how to influence states. Consequently, strategies that exploit one mechanism can stifle the effects of another. Thus, while Moore’s general approach is commendable, the broader empirical literature and competing conceptual models pose considerable challenges to his theoretical claims and policy prescriptions. Until the mechanisms, and relationships between them, are better understood, we are unlikely to approach a solution to the war puzzle. Indeed, institutions and actors that pay inadequate attention to these dynamics may hamper, rather than enhance, the prospects of peace.

### AT: Heg

**No impact to heg**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

## 1NR

### Biotech

**New cures solve all diseases, including tuberculosis**

**ASNS, 2008**

ASNS, Africa Science News Service, Uganda, 9-15-2008, AIDS cure may lie in supercharged "mineral water"

Antibiotics and vaccines that prompt side effects, genetic mutations, and resistant germs may soon be obsolete pending the results of an AIDS trial sponsored by volunteers, humanitarian groups, and The Republic of Uganda. At the Victoria Medical Center, in this nation at the epicenter of the pandemic, a new type of "mineral water" will be tested to compete with the drug industry's most profitable weapons against disease. As governments worldwide are stockpiling defenses against bioterrorist attacks and deadly new outbreaks, Uganda will test a new possible cure for infectious diseases made from energized water and silver. It is called UPCOSHTM, short for "Uniform Picoscaler Concentrated Oligodynamic Silver Hydrosol." OXYSILVERTM is the leading brand. The base formula was developed by NASA scientists to protect astronauts in space. The solution of pure water and energized silver and oxygen uniquely boasts a covalent electromagnetic bond between these two non-toxic elements that kills most harmful germs, oxygenates the blood, alkalines the body, helps feed essential nutrients to healthy cells and desirable digestive bacteria, and even relays a musical note upon which active DNA depends. These factors are crucial for developing mega-immunity and winning the war against cancer and infectious diseases experts say. According to the product's developers, including famous health scientists, this entirely new class of liquids and gels is performing "miraculously" in killing HIV, the AIDS virus, tuberculosis, and malaria in initial tests. Africa's greatest killers (after starvation, dehydration, and resulting immunological destruction) are no match for a few drops of UPCOSHTM. Even using a germ infested glass, as is commonly the case in the poorest communities, you need not fear. This water safely disinfects everything it touches. Ugandan officials were encouraged by the nation's leading AIDS activist, Peter Luyima, co-founder of the WASART African Youth Movement, to study OXYSILVERTM. Mr. Luyima invited several humanitarian doctors, researchers, organizations, and corporations to sponsor this promising human experiment on 70 terminally-ill patients. If successful, the government plans to grant funding to Mr. Luyima's youth organization to establish an OXYSILVERTM manufacturing plant to supply this life-saving liquid to distributors across Africa. "Better late than never, OXYSILVERTM may prove to be civilization's greatest hope for surviving against the current and coming plagues," says Dr. Leonard Horowitz, an award-winning public health and emerging diseases expert who contributed to the product's electro-genetic formulation. Author of the American bestseller, Emerging Viruses: AIDS & Ebola--Nature, Accident or Intentional?, and the scientific text, DNA: Pirates of the Sacred Spiral, Dr. Horowitz is most critical of the drug cartel profiting from humanity's suffering.

No asteroid threat

**Wall, 13**

(Michael, Michael was a science writer for the Idaho National Laboratory and has been an intern at Wired.com, The Salinas Californian newspaper, and the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory. He has also worked as a herpetologist and wildlife biologist. He has a Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia, a bachelor's degree from the University of Arizona, and a graduate certificate in science writing from the University of California, Santa Cruz. “Deflecting Killer Asteroid Could Be Geopolitical Nightmare” by Mike Wall, SPACE.com Senior Writer: 14 March 2013)

While astronomers have spotted 95 percent of the 980 near-Earth asteroids at least 0.6 miles (1 km) wide, which might end civilization if they hit us, many smaller but still hazardous space rocks remain undetected. Researchers have discovered less than 30 percent of the close-flying 330-foot-wide (100 m) objects, for example, which could destroy an area the size of a state if they hit us. And they've mapped out the orbits of less than 1 percent of the 130-footers thought to be out there, which could wipe out a city. In all, just 9,700 near-Earth asteroids have been catalogued to date, out of a population numbering in the millions. Many astronomers and politicians are thus calling for more resources to be put toward asteroid-detection efforts, so that we have a better idea of what's headed our way in the future. Something big will hit us again, experts say, and we'll probably need years or decades of warning to do something about it. [Meteor Explodes Over Russia (Video)] How to deflect an asteroid Scientists think they know how to deflect an asteroid headed directly for Earth, given enough lead time. The strategy involves mounting at least two coordinated space missions, Schweickart said. The first would slam a kinetic impactor into the asteroid to knock it off course. The second would launch a "gravity tractor" probe to fly alongside the space rock, nudging it farther via a tiny but persistent gravitational tug. "You always need a gravity tractor there to ensure that any deflection does not end up having the asteroid go through a [gravitational] 'keyhole,' which would simply bring it back later," Schweickart told SPACE.com. This approach can avert more than 98 percent of projected collisions, according to a 2008 report called "Asteroid Threats: A Call for Global Response." The report was put together by the Association of Space Explorers' International Panel on Asteroid Threat Mitigation, which Schweickart chaired. [Photos: Asteroids in Deep Space] A different strategy — such as a nuclear blast — may be needed for asteroids more than 1,300 feet (400 m) wide, or for those detected with little warning time, the report adds. But such dire cases are likely to come along just once every 100,000 years or so. Political hurdles Humanity has successfully demonstrated both aspects of the impactor-tractor technique. In 2005, for example, NASA smashed a probe into the Comet Tempel 1 to investigate the icy body's composition. And several spacecraft, such as NASA's Dawn probe and Japan's Hayabusa craft, have rendezvoused with asteroids in deep space. But the main challenges of an asteroid-deflection mission will probably be more political than technical, Schweickart said. And perhaps the biggest hurdle of all will be getting the world to agree which way to steer the asteroid. Each incoming asteroid whose orbit has been mapped will threaten Earth along a specific "risk corridor" — a line of potential impact sites that extends about 180 degrees across the planet's surface but is just a few tens of kilometers wide. A deflection campaign would not be able to make huge changes to the dangerous asteroid's orbit. Rather, it could merely drag the projected impact point along the risk corridor to the left or to the right, by slowing the space rock down or speeding it up slightly. The goal, of course, would be to drag the impact site off the planet entirely. But determining how exactly to achieve this — to go left or right, to push the asteroid or to pull it — would be difficult, for any decision would necessarily put some nations at greater risk than others, Schweickart said. "If you start a deflection and something goes wrong, you have now shifted that impact point along the risk corridor one way or the other," Schweickart said. "And now people are in danger who were not in danger before you started this operation." And that's just one of many tricky geopolitical issues a potential asteroid-deflection mission would present, he added. "Who does it? Who pays for it? Who handles the liability?" Schweickart said. "How does the decision get made? Do we deflect the 40-meter object, or do we evacuate? Who makes that decision? And who pays for the evacuation? Everybody, because we all collectively made the decision? Or do the people who were unlucky enough to evacuate have to handle the cost?" Getting the ball rolling Schweickart and many of his colleagues think it's imperative to develop an international framework for dealing with the asteroid threat, so that the world can work together to predict and prevent catastrophic impacts. The Association of Space Explorers (ASE) — a group of veteran astronauts and cosmonauts — lays out a proposed framework in its 2008 report, calling for the United Nations to oversee a three-tiered program consisting of 1) an international asteroid detection and warning network; 2) a mission-planning group that would assess deflection options; and 3) a mission-authorization body tasked with developing "the policies and guidelines that represent the international will to respond to the global impact hazard." The United Nations' Action Team on Near-Earth Objects — better known as Action Team 14 — embraced much of this plan in a set of recommendations it drew up late last year. These recommendations are likely to be adopted by the U.N.'s Working Group on Near-Earth Objects, then go up the chain from there, ASE officials said. "Given the work methods of the [UN's] Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the recommendations of the Working Group will likely be adopted by the Committee in June," ASE officials wrote in a Feb. 27 update. "The [UN] General Assembly will likely follow suit in October without further discussions." The U.N.'s ponderous pace and many layers of bureaucracy may be frustrating to scientists who have been working the technical side of the hazardous-asteroid problem for years. But Schweickart voiced optimism that the political progress made will eventually be worth the wait. "When you get there, the whole world has bought into it," he said. "I mean, you're moving the whole world."

### Econ

#### Mexican geography is the intersection of US neoliberal and security practices – border policing is the North’s attempt to secure the harms of economic expansion and development, perpetuating militarism and widespread social injustice in the global South

**Coleman, 5** (Matt Coleman – Department of Geography, UCLA, “U.S. statecraft and the U.S.–Mexico border as security/economy nexus”, Political Geography) Mike

Although not denying the symbolic importance of U.S. geopolitical practice in the¶ border region, Nevins (2002) suggests that border policing cannot be condensed to¶ a media event. Rather, Nevins counsels that as a real-world militarized practice¶ responsible for large numbers of migrant deaths (see also Eschbach, Hagan,¶ Rodriguez, Herna´ndez-Le´on, & Bailey, 1999), border policing tends to complement¶ the neoliberalization of the border in that it concerns a xenophobic and¶ hypernationalist instatement of borderland law and order against ﬂows of migrants¶ unleashed by the liberalization of rural and urban Mexico. In this sense, Nevins¶ names the U.S. a ‘‘gatekeeper state’’ which manages the migratory fallout of U.S.-led¶ Mexican market restructuring. The gatekeeper state, Nevins argues, provides¶ ‘‘extraterritorial opportunities for national territory-based capital (thus intensifying¶ the process of globalization) while, somewhat paradoxically, providing security¶ against the perceived social costs unleashed by globalization’’ (2002: 178).¶ Both Andreas and Nevins caution against a theorization of U.S. statecraft as¶ a coherent phenomenon. However, the tendency in both projects is, generally, to¶ look for the points of coincidence between U.S. geopolitical and geoeconomic¶ practice in the border region. This tendency is front and center in Andreas’ analysis,¶ in which border policing is presented more or less functionally in terms of a larger¶ U.S. project of continental neoliberalization. For example, Andreas seems to suggest¶ that U.S. geopolitical practice (i.e. customs and immigration policing) exists as¶ a second-order theatrical foil to U.S. geoeconomic interests (i.e. free trade), such that¶ ‘‘real’’ U.S. trade interests are strategically accompanied by parallel security¶ ‘‘images’’. In contrast, the incoherences of U.S. policy in the borderlands –¶ speciﬁcally, the struggle between the U.S. free trade and border policing agendas, in¶ both local and national contexts – are stated much more forcefully in Nevins’ work¶ which is concerned to highlight how ‘‘diﬀerent boundary regulatory regimes relate to¶ the [contradictory] security and opportunity components of the modern territorial¶ state’’ (2002: 178). This said, in his speciﬁc empirical discussion of U.S. border¶ policing in the mid- to late-1990s, Nevins’ argument tends to reconcile U.S.¶ geopolitical practice in the borderlands with U.S. geoeconomic interests. For Nevins,¶ the U.S.-led NAFTAization of the border region and U.S. border policing go hand¶ in hand as far as both are corresponding disciplinary practices, the former focused¶ on markets and the latter focused on bodies disenfranchized by economic restructuring. Importantly, Nevins does not suggest that this coincidence is intended,¶ but rather that economic liberalization has compelled the militarization of the U.S.¶ Southwest border as migrants are pushed northwards. In this sense, Nevins considers¶ the patterned meeting of U.S. geopolitical and geoeconomic policies in the region¶ rather than their intended coherences.

#### The impact is unending warfare waged against hostile “others”

**Coleman, 5** (Matt Coleman – Department of Geography, UCLA, “U.S. statecraft and the U.S.–Mexico border as security/economy nexus”, Political Geography) Mike

Importantly, the border as security/economy nexus suggests a geography of¶ statecraft in which geopolitical and geoeconomic power is not a singular, coherent¶ capacity neatly ‘‘pooled up’’ at the center of the sovereign state (Agnew, 1999;¶ Jessop, 1990; Murphy, 1996) and then deployed spatially, as if the state is a juridicoeconomic whole (Gordon, 1991) of symbiotic legal-military and market access¶ projects with the border as its place of focus. Rather, as a Janus-faced geography¶ (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999), the border as security/economy nexus is literally¶ a strategic terrain where countervailing projects of statecraft come to bear on one¶ another. This brings us back to the problem of the nonlocal production of the border¶ introduced at the outset of this essay. As designs conceived nonlocally in which the¶ border ﬁgures from afar as an uncomplicated landscape amenable to either¶ rebordering or debordering ‘‘national interests’’, U.S. geopolitical and geoeconomic¶ practices are much more complicated at the local scale where they come face-to-face¶ with one another. From the remote perspective of U.S. congressional lawmakers and¶ executive policymakers the border might appear to be a simple, instrumental frontier¶ open to geopolitical and geoeconomic takeovers. However, these nonlocal territorial¶ ‘‘intentionalities of control’’ (Yuval-Davis, 2003) come apart in terms of the local¶ circumstances each produce. In this sense, U.S. geopolitics and geoeconomics in the¶ border region, although clearly geographical in their respective colonizations of the¶ border as a malleable frontier, are anti-geographical in that their instrumental¶ mappings of territory obscure the complex place-based realities of their deployment¶ (Dalby, 1998; O´¶ Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). It follows that U.S. statecraft in the¶ borderlands can be read as a fraught bundle of geopolitical and geoeconomic¶ ‘‘storylines’’ rather than as a coherent sovereign ‘‘script’’ (O´¶ Tuathail, 2002).¶ But such storylines are about more than competing and countervailing practices¶ in a narrow sense because statecraft is not simply about strategy. For instance, on¶ a cultural register, statecraft is about how an imputed body politic comes to know¶ and celebrate itself in relation to identiﬁcations of danger (for example, see Burke,¶ 2002; Weldes, Laﬀey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). If we note, then, that geopolitical¶ and geoeconomic practices are not just organizational phenomena but also¶ articulations of identity (Albert, Jacobsen, & Lapid, 2001; Paasi, 1996), to admit¶ the convoluted character of U.S. geopolitical and geoeconomic practice implicating¶ the U.S.–Mexico border region is to call into question not just the concept of U.S.¶ foreign policy as a coherent mode of government, but further the notion of a singular¶ identity informing U.S. statecraft.¶ Recent work by Mead (2001) helps to unpack the multiple identities undergirding¶ U.S. geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy in the U.S.–Mexico border region. For¶ example, the geopolitical representation of the border as a geography in need of¶ policing discloses a realist Jacksonian identity in U.S. statecraft. In this cultural¶ mindset, the border marks a gap between an exceptional, popular domestic realm of¶ citizenship and community, and an anarchic outside world of danger to be kept at¶ bay through heavily militarized borders. This Jacksonian impulse understands its¶ beleaguering ‘‘others’’ in the last instance to be neither accommodating nor¶ redeemable. The result is a conviction that hostile ‘‘others’’ – a confused collection of¶ undocumented migrants, narcotics traﬃckers, ‘‘criminal aliens’’, and terrorists,¶ deﬁned in conﬂated foreign policy and public policy contexts – need to be fought oﬀ¶ through sustained frontier warfare in the form of hard borders and tough¶ immigration legislation.